---
title: Rethinking Propaganda
subtitle: How State Media Build Trust Through Belief Affirmation \vspace{0.2cm}
author: \emph{Anton Shirikov}^[Postdoctoral Scholar in Russian Politics at the Harriman Institute, Columbia University, as6859@columbia.edu. I am grateful to Scott Gehlbach, Yoshiko Herrera, Rikhil Bhavnani, Jessica Weeks, Adeline Lo, Joshua Tucker, Arturas Rozenas, Bryn Rosenfeld, Timothy Frye, Junyan Jiang, Guzel Garifullina, John Marshall, Jon Pevehouse, Michael Masterson, Jonathan Renshon, the participants at the ASEEES (2018, 2019), MPSA (2019, 2021), and APSA (2020) conferences, and at various workshops at the University of Wisconsin--Madison, Columbia University, New York University, Yale University, and the University of Kansas for helpful comments and suggestions. I acknowledge financial support from the Harriman Institute (Columbia University); from the Department of Political Science, the Center for Russia, East Europe, and Central Asia, and the Office of the Provost (all at UW--Madison). This work was also assisted by a dissertation writing grant from the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies.]
date: \emph{`r format(Sys.time(), '%B %d, %Y')`}
abstract: \singlespacing\noindent Research on propaganda often focuses on strategies that autocrats can use to persuade skeptical citizens. In this paper, I outline a different function of propaganda---reinforcing regime support and building trust through identity-consistent messages. Such affirmation propaganda results in more positive perceptions of propaganda outlets and skepticism about independent media. I test this argument using three studies in Russia. In two randomized experiments, I demonstrate that pro-regime citizens trust reports from state media more than reports from independent media; however, state media lose trust if they send more critical messages. Additional survey evidence suggests that regime supporters often find state media accurate despite recognizing the pro-government bias of these outlets. My analysis suggests that autocrats are more constrained by public opinion than previously thought. It also helps to better understand the role of persuasion and censorship in authoritarian regimes, and it highlights that independent media have limited power to challenge authoritarian rule.
output:
  bookdown::pdf_document2:
    keep_tex: true
    toc: no
    latex_engine: lualatex
urlcolor: blue
fontsize: 12pt
bibliography: masterbib_JOP.bib
biblio-style: "chicago-author-date"
#biblio-style: C:/Users/shiri/Dropbox/Bibliography/chicago-author-date.csl
link-citations: true
fig_caption: true
indent: true
header-includes:
- \usepackage[T1]{fontenc}
- \usepackage[default]{sourceserifpro}
- \usepackage{xcolor}
- \usepackage{setspace}
- \onehalfspacing
- \usepackage{caption}
- \usepackage{threeparttable}
- \usepackage{threeparttablex}
- \setlength{\parskip}{0.5em}
- \usepackage{tikz}
---

\pagenumbering{gobble}

Word count: 9,945


```{r setup, include=FALSE}
knitr::opts_chunk$set(echo = FALSE, warning = FALSE, message = FALSE)
```

```{r theme, echo = FALSE}
library(knitr)
library(kableExtra)
library(tidyverse)
library(gt)
library(showtext)
library(lubridate)

font_add_google("Source Sans Pro", "sourcesanspro")

myggtheme <- theme_bw() +
  theme(plot.title = element_text(size = 30,
                                    family = "sourcesanspro"),
        plot.title.position = "plot",
        plot.subtitle = element_text(size = 22,
                                    family = "sourcesanspro"),
        strip.text = element_text(size = 26,
                                    family = "sourcesanspro"),
        axis.title.y = element_text(size = 26,
                                    family = "sourcesanspro",
                                    margin = margin(t = 12, r = 0, 
                                                    b = 0, l = 0)),
        axis.text.y = element_text(size = 26,
                                    family = "sourcesanspro"),
        axis.title.x = element_text(size = 26,
                                    family = "sourcesanspro",
                                    margin = margin(t = 12, r = 0, 
                                                    b = 0, l = 0)),
        axis.text.x = element_text(size = 26,
                                    family = "sourcesanspro"),
        legend.text = element_text(size = 22,
                                    family = "sourcesanspro"),
        legend.title = element_text(size = 22,
                                    family = "sourcesanspro"),
        panel.grid.major = element_blank(),
        panel.grid.minor = element_blank(),
        legend.position = "bottom",
        panel.spacing = unit(1, "lines")) 



```

\doublespacing

\newpage

\pagenumbering{arabic}

Many autocracies today extensively use propaganda via state media and social media [@GurievTreisman2019; @King.etal2017; @Gehlbach2010; @Rozenas.Stukal2019], and yet, scholars still debate how exactly propaganda works. Research documents that citizens of autocracies can process media messages critically and often detect manipulation [@Wedeen1999; @Mickiewicz2008; @Rosenfeld2018; @SimonovRao2022]. How, then, can propaganda succeed against this purported skepticism? One common answer is that autocrats employ a variety of cleverly designed strategies to make propaganda more persuasive [@StockmannGallagher2011; @GehlbachSonin2014; @Rozenas.Stukal2019; @Gehlbach2010; @Tolz.Teper2018; @CarterCarter2023]. Other research, however, notes that persuasion is unlikely when the public is skeptical, so autocrats may instead use propaganda to signal their dominance or create uncertainty [@Huang2015; @Little2017; @HuangCruz2022], forcing some desired behavior on citizens. 

Despite these disagreements, a notion most common to research on autocracies is that propaganda is a manipulation imposed on the public from above (therefore, it is natural for citizens to be skeptical about it). However, recent research suggests that the relationship between autocrats and citizens is rarely so unidirectional. Such regimes can develop complex political and emotional connections to the public [@GreeneRobertson2019], and they are often more responsive to citizens' concerns [@ChenPanXu2016; @Chapman2021] than previously thought. The "top-down" view on propaganda also does not square well with an extensive body of work on media and political communication, which shows that changing beliefs and attitudes is difficult [@Taber.Lodge2006; @ArceneauxJohnson2013; @Nyhan.Reifler2010], and that media often have to cater to news consumers' existing worldviews to win their trust [@Gentzkow.Shapiro2006].

In this paper, I suggest a rethinking of the role that propaganda plays in authoritarian regimes such as Vladimir Putin's Russia. Instead of persuasion or intimidation, propaganda can satisfy public demand for political ideas and narratives, crafting its message around regime supporters' core beliefs. Such *affirmation propaganda* offers citizens emotional comfort, acknowledging their concerns and validating those identities that are the basis for regime support. Thus, state media outlets, similar to partisan media in democracies, can use identity-consistent reporting targeted at regime supporters to present themselves as trustworthy and cast independent news sources, which offer more critical reporting, as untrustworthy. Citizens reciprocate belief-affirming messages from the regime by *choosing* to stay in the echo chamber of propaganda. Thus, propaganda can be seen as a form of responsiveness that improves the stability and day-to-day functioning of autocratic regimes.

This characterization of propaganda builds on a crucial insight: autocrats may enjoy genuine and long-standing mass support [@GreeneRobertson2019; @Matovski2021]. A strong support base changes the calculus for autocrats, making it more important to reinforce the connection with existing supporters and maintain their trust than to persuade the skeptics or intimidate potential protesters. Moreover, I argue and demonstrate that in such conditions, making propaganda more appealing to the skeptical public may be counterproductive---these efforts can backfire among regime supporters. 

I test this theory of propaganda in Russia under the rule of Vladimir Putin, a prime example of an "informational autocrat" [@GurievTreisman2019; @Gehlbach2010]. Over time, Putin has accumulated control over the mainstream media [@EnikolopovPetrovaZhuravskaya2011; @Lipman.etal2018], and his regime has extensively used propaganda domestically and abroad. Recently, Putin's propaganda machine came into spotlight as it aided the Kremlin in its war on Ukraine and prompted Russians to believe absurd lies about the neighboring country, often despite personal testimonies of their Ukrainian relatives [@Hopkins2022]. Survey evidence also shows that the overwhelming majority of Russians have for decades consumed highly biased state media despite the availability of independent news organizations [@Levada2020a]. My results help us better understand Russians' receptivity to Kremlin-sponsored disinformation. 

My analysis is based on three related studies, including a unique large-scale online experiment ($n \approx$ 22,400) in which Russians attempted to guess whether various news stories were true or false. My research design has several important features that reduce social desirability and put respondents in a situation similar to real-world news consumption, encouraging them to evaluate a large and diverse set of news messages. The results of this study are consistent with findings from two other samples of the Russian population and robust across various model specifications.

I first demonstrate that citizens sympathetic to Putin were substantially more likely than Putin critics to believe pro-regime messages, but regime supporters were much more skeptical about critical messages, typically published by independent media. Moreover, propaganda was most easily accepted when it spoke directly to supporters' core beliefs. 

Further, I experimentally show that state propaganda outlets elicit greater trust among regime supporters than do independent media: pro-Putin respondents were more likely to believe news messages when these messages were randomly attributed to a state source than when the same messages were attributed to an independent news source. I replicate this result in a survey experiment on a nationally representative sample ($n \approx$ 1,600).

However, Putin supporters no longer viewed state media outlets as more credible when these outlets purportedly published critical messages. Thus, more "balanced" and "accurate" propaganda can alienate the regime's support base, damaging trust in state media.

In another large survey on a representative online sample ($n \approx$ 2,200), I show that even though many Putin supporters recognized the pro-government bias of state media outlets, most of them still evaluated these outlets as accurate and trustworthy. 

Overall, my study documents that citizens of autocracies can genuinely prefer propaganda to more balanced and independent news reporting, and skepticism about propaganda is less widespread in authoritarian societies than some scholars believe. My findings are related to the previous research that described how citizens can find value in state propaganda [@EsareyEtAl2016; @Oates2007; @Blum2022] and how such propaganda can be emotionally appealing [@MattinglyYao2021]. By documenting the perceptions of media and information in Russia, my study contributes to the growing literature on politically biased information processing in non-democracies [@Robertson2015; @Chapman2021; @Huang2017; @LaebensOzturk2020], the polarizing effects of media in such polities [@Baysan2022; @EnikolopovEtAl2022], and on media and polarization more broadly [@BowenEtAl2023]. 

This study also emphasizes that citizens in authoritarian regimes are not simply objects of manipulation and brainwashing. Propaganda can speak to citizens' identities, and it needs to account for the public's existing views to be successful. Therefore, my analysis contributes to our understanding of the limits of authoritarian control and manipulation [@Rosenfeld2018; @Frye2021], showing that autocrats are not omnipotent, highly rational manipulators that they are sometimes portrayed to be.

My research complements recent work on the strategies and tactics of authoritarian information manipulation [see e.g., @Huang2015; @AlrababahBlaydes2021; @CarterCarter2023], highlighting an important, previously overlooked role of propaganda. While affirmation propaganda can be effective on its own, helping to reinforce pro-regime views, it can also increase the effectiveness of persuasion techniques such as blame-shifting [@Rozenas.Stukal2019], as it improves trust in state-run media.

I also shed light on why non-democratic regimes often allow independent media, which may undermine the plausibility of propaganda [@GlaselPaula2019]. Previous work has argued that such media can provide useful information to autocrats [@EgorovGurievSonin2009; @Lorentzen2014] or make citizens more content [@KernHainmueller2009; @Huang2017]. My analysis suggests that citizens in the propaganda bubble find other news sources unattractive, which reduces the danger of independent media to autocrats while keeping their benefits identified by earlier scholarship.

Finally, my results are relevant to the formal theoretical work on propaganda and Bayesian persuasion [@Kamenica.Gentzkow2011; @Edmond2013; @GehlbachSonin2014]. This research often assumes a uniform response to information manipulation and citizens' ability to observe media bias, whereas my analysis suggests that it is worth explicitly modeling the heterogeneity of political identities and news perceptions [@GentzkowEtAl2021].

# How Propaganda Works: Belief Affirmation and Trust in State Media {#Theory}

Authoritarian propaganda is commonly viewed as a strategic effort to manipulate citizens' attitudes and behavior [@GehlbachSonin2014; @LuoRozenas2022], and often, scholars assume citizens to be suspicious of it [@Mickiewicz2008]. Thus, theories of propaganda ask: How do autocrats win over the skeptical public? They may use sophisticated techniques, such as mixing fact with fiction [@StockmannGallagher2011; @Gehlbach2010] or blending political messages with entertainment [@Tolz.Teper2018], to make propaganda more plausible and project competence [@GurievTreisman2019]. Alternatively, autocrats may forgo persuasion and use propaganda to signal the regime's dominance [@Huang2015; @Wedeen1999; @Little2017; @HuangCruz2022], threaten the opposition [@CarterCarter2022], instill political apathy [@Walker.Orttung2014], distract the public [@King.etal2017], or undermine alternative information sources [@Pearce.Kendzior2012; @Pomerantsev2015]. 

Yet, while many studies examine how propaganda helps autocrats, scholars rarely ask what it does for citizens [@Oates2007]. One reason for this omission is that autocracy is usually seen as a minority rule forced on the population. As @Przeworski2022 notes, autocratic regimes are "assumed to be inherently brittle, surviving only because people are misled or repressed."

However, new research on authoritarian regimes suggests that the "minority rule" assumption is too limiting. Many autocracies are fairly consolidated regimes with genuine and substantial popular support [@Matovski2021]. In such regimes, autocrats can be responsive to citizens' concerns [@ChenPanXu2016; @SuMeng2016], and they build meaningful emotional and identity connections with the public [@Sharafutdinova2020; @LaebensOzturk2020], involving citizens as participants in regime maintenance and "co-constructors" of the political discourse [@GreeneRobertson2019; @Chapman2021]. 

For autocrats with a strong and stable support base, it becomes more important to prevent the erosion of existing support than to win over the critics (in [Appendix A](#gamemodel), I model the choice between these two goals and show that with the majority on the autocrat's side, it is optimal to disregard the opposition-minded public). These considerations make popular autocratic regimes more similar to established parties in democracies, which often have to cater to their supporters. Therefore, to explain how propaganda operates in such regimes, it is important to consider the research on partisan political communication. 

A large body of work shows that individuals tend to accept congenial news information and reject incongruent messages [@Nickerson1998; @Taber.Lodge2006; @Nyhan.Reifler2010], and that they often select into consuming like-minded media [@ArceneauxJohnson2013], viewing "oppositional" media as untrustworthy and hostile [@Feldman2014].^[Trust in politically congruent sources may emerge even if citizens do not engage in motivated reasoning [@GentzkowEtAl2021].] Consequently, media outlets often need to adopt partisan biases and slants if they want to gain trust among target audiences [@Gentzkow.Shapiro2006]. Such politically congruent reporting is designed to reinforce existing beliefs and attitudes rather than change minds [@ArceneauxJohnson2013; @Stroud2010].

However, the literature on partisan communication does not consider propaganda promoted via state-run media. In turn, research on autocracies has been slow in adopting the models of selective exposure and partisan reasoning. Many studies of authoritarian propaganda, instead, build on more traditional theories of political communication, assuming a fairly passive audience and a more or less uniform response to information manipulation among citizens; hence, the conclusion that propaganda just needs to be properly designed to persuade the public. Some other work [e.g., @Huang2015] can be seen as following the "minimal effects" model [@BennettIyengar2008], which implies that persuasion attempts are largely futile. Only a few recent analyses of autocracies [@Baysan2022; @EnikolopovEtAl2022; @LaebensOzturk2020] and propaganda [@Robertson2015; @Truex2016a; @Huang2017; @Chapman2021] consider heterogeneous "partisan" responses to media messages, but this work does not systematically investigate the implications of such politically biased news processing for propaganda strategies or trust in state-controlled and independent media.

Drawing both on the recent political communication research and the new work on autocracies, I argue that authoritarian propaganda can follow the approach of partisan media by incorporating and reproducing the existing beliefs, values, and political emotions of the pro-regime majority. Such *affirmation propaganda* keeps the connection between the autocrat and the public alive. It reinforces "old" and familiar themes instead of trying to make "new" arguments---e.g., corroborating the regime's economic competence [@GurievTreisman2022]---or signaling strength through grand and ridiculous statements [@Huang2015].

More specifically, the role of state media in this situation resembles the behavior of partisan outlets whose party is in power: they amplify the government's successes, downplay problems, and disparage internal or external opponents. One difference is that authoritarian media engage in egregious disinformation and censorship [@PaulMatthews2016], much more so than partisan news organizations in democracies. Moreover, while partisan media can criticize the government, especially when their party is out of power, state media rarely have that benefit. These factors somewhat restrict trust in propaganda outlets, so most citizens are unlikely to become fervent fans of such media. Yet, via pro-identity messages, state media outlets still signal that they are on the side of regime supporters and should be taken relatively seriously, especially compared to alternative (independent) news sources, which offer more critical reporting. In contrast to state media, independent outlets appear unreliable and untrustworthy to pro-regime citizens.

Importantly, following @ArceneauxJohnson2013 and related work [e.g., @Ruggiero2000], I posit a more active public, compared to the traditional research on propaganda that treated citizens as rather passive receivers of information. Individuals can choose between state-run and alternative news sources or at least between consuming and not consuming state media.^[In most autocracies, citizens can access independent media, although that may require additional effort.] Therefore, propaganda outlets need to respond to citizens' concerns and offer them something of value. Affirmation propaganda, in particular, helps regime supporters to feel better about themselves and their country, enabling the majority to maintain its identity. Supporters may also value having news outlets they perceive as reliable.^[Other work argues that state media can maintain interest through entertaining content [@Gehlbach2010; @Schimpfossl.Yablokov2014; @Tolz.Teper2018], but that would not allow them to generate trust.] 

As an example, consider propaganda in Vladimir Putin's Russia. Putin has enjoyed strong and stable popular support for years,^[https://www.levada.ru/en/ratings/.] partly thanks to the growth of the Russian economy and other major policy decisions [@Treisman2011; @GreeneRobertson2022]. Therefore, attracting additional supporters has rarely been a priority for him. Instead, especially as the regime was consolidating, it was essential to maintain the interest and trust of the already sympathetic public. Consequently, the Kremlin's propaganda focused [@Sharafutdinova2020] on the themes that strongly resonated with the pro-Putin majority---Russia's disastrous post-communist transition [@BelmonteRochlitz2019] and the country's diminished global standing after the Soviet collapse, which were commonly blamed on the U.S. and NATO [@Sokolov.etal2018]. State media highlighted citizens' grievances, their Soviet nostalgia, and the trauma of the Soviet collapse, simultaneously offering hope of restoring Russia's greatness and dignity [@GreeneRobertson2019]. As the internal opposition was weak, state media painted the West as Russia's existential enemy and portrayed domestic regime critics as proxies for Western governments (many opposition activists and independent journalists were designated "foreign agents"). These identity appeals became especially prominent after the protests of 2011--2012 when the pro-regime majority appeared to be at risk. 

Given the opacity of authoritarian regimes, it is difficult to establish whether and when affirmation propaganda is a deliberate choice. The evidence provided above is consistent with the idea that the Kremlin has used affirmation propaganda to prevent the erosion of Putin's support base, but my analysis does not directly test this conjecture. Instead, I examine the key foundations of affirmation propaganda: that the public is receptive to congenial propaganda messages and that belief-affirming political coverage can improve trust in state media. The preceding discussion suggests the following testable expectations. 

Hypothesis 1a: **Regime supporters are more likely to find propaganda messages targeting their identity credible, compared to opposition-minded citizens (critics) who should be more skeptical about such propaganda**. In the Russian case, this means statements that praise Russia or its government or contain anti-Western sentiment; I label such news content "pro-Russia messages." 

Hypothesis 1b: **Supporters are less likely to find messages inconsistent with their pro-regime beliefs ("critical messages") credible, compared to opposition-minded citizens**. Critical messages may discuss problems in Russia or positive developments in Western countries or Ukraine.

Hypothesis 2a: **Regime supporters trust state media outlets more than independent media organizations**.^[I use the terms "state media," "state-controlled media," and "state propaganda outlets" interchangeably.] 

Hypothesis 2b: **Supporters are less likely than critics to recognize that the coverage of state media outlets is censored and inaccurate**.  

At the same time, trust in state media can be lost if these media diverge from the expectations of pro-regime citizens. Existing research often suggests that autocrats can make propaganda more plausible to the skeptics by decreasing the pro-regime bias---e.g., incorporating critical messages or admitting failures [@StockmannGallagher2011; @GehlbachSonin2014; @Rozenas.Stukal2019; @CarterCarter2023]. However, the model in [Appendix A](#gamemodel) shows formally that if the opposition is fairly distant ideologically, appeals to critics can backfire: even though opposition-minded citizens may find such nuanced propaganda reporting more accurate, supporters would be alienated by it. Therefore, **when propaganda outlets include critical messages, their perceived trustworthiness is increased among critics but reduced among supporters** (Hypothesis 3). 

This discussion helps us better understand the role of persuasion in authoritarian propaganda efforts. The space for persuasion is larger when regime support is weak, but it shrinks when the pro-regime majority is substantial, as supporters are already not that skeptical, and the skeptical minority can be ignored or repressed. At the same time, even robust regimes cannot always rely on belief-affirming tactics because they sometimes need to convey new narratives to the sympathetic majority. Still, by increasing trust in state outlets, affirmation propaganda can facilitate the promotion of "new" ideas. Further, when convincing is needed, governments can persuade more effectively by incorporating new messages into more familiar themes, which the public likes to hear.

For example, when the Kremlin's propaganda tried to justify Russia's war on Ukraine, it benefited from the public's receptivity to state media, but it also framed the conflict in terms that Putin supporters could sympathize with. State outlets portrayed Ukraine as NATO's puppet in its alleged effort to destroy Russia, and they drew parallels between the current conflict and World War II. The new narrative about Ukraine as a military threat was integrated into familiar anti-Western narratives and supplemented with comforting tales about Russians fighting Nazis.

It is also important to note that affirmation propaganda can complement but not substitute media censorship. Core regime supporters may decidedly prefer state media and avoid independent media, and if the majority only consisted of such strong supporters, censorship would be redundant. However, exposure to alternative information sources can undermine pro-regime beliefs or trust in state media among moderate, less "partisan" supporters, and censorship helps to prevent that. Ultimately, affirmation propaganda makes it less likely that citizens would seek alternative media, but it does not eliminate the need for censorship.

To sum up, viewing propaganda only as manipulation applied to induce certain behavior or attitudes oversimplifies information politics in autocracies. Rather, propaganda can be part of a broader relationship between autocrats and the public: it allows governments to demonstrate their responsiveness and fulfill citizens' demand for political connection, a feeling of pride, a sense of belonging to a national community, etc. Such propaganda can mobilize core supporters [@Gunitsky2015] and strengthen their emotional association with the regime [@GreeneRobertson2022]. However, affirmation propaganda may also placate the public, especially less politicized and sophisticated individuals [@Zhelnina2020; @Alyukov2022], making them more complacent by exposing them to politically comfortable messages. This is why so many citizens in autocracies may genuinely prefer the content of state media to more independent news sources. But my analysis also suggests that shaping and changing public opinion under autocracy is not easy. Propaganda has to cater to existing identities and political expectations, and when it fails to do so, the public may stop listening.

# Research Design {#Design}

This analysis is based on three surveys conducted in Russia. In all three studies, the participants were shown a series of news stories, including pro-Russia messages and critical messages, displayed in random order. Respondents were asked to indicate whether each story was, in their view, true or false. Therefore, these three surveys allow me to examine the perceptions of pro-regime content in different samples of Russians (H1). In Study 1, a large-scale online survey fielded on social media in May--June 2020 ("the main study"), I also embedded an experiment to examine the perceptions of the credibility of state media outlets in comparison to independent media (H2 and H3). Study 2, a survey fielded via the polling firm Levada Center in August 2019 ("the national survey"), extends the analysis to a nationally representative sample. Study 3, an online survey fielded via the polling company OMI in May--June 2020 ("the media perceptions survey"), provides additional evidence on the perceived trustworthiness and accuracy of state and independent media. 

## The Online Quiz (Study 1)

I designed and promoted the main study as a "quiz" that offered respondents an opportunity to test how well they detect false news messages. This approach, inspired by online trivia quizzes,^[See, e.g., the recurring BuzzFeed quiz on fake news: https://www.buzzfeed.com/tag/fake-news-quiz.] has several advantages in examining the perceptions of propaganda.

By turning news evaluations into a game, I provided internal motivation to evaluate a large number of diverse news messages, ensuring that the results are not overly dependent on individual stories. The quiz premise also improves accuracy motivation, prompting respondents to answer more honestly and reducing the expressive responding to political stories.^[Increased accuracy motivation may, however, reduce the impact of political reasoning [@PriorSoodKhanna2015]. If so, the estimated differences in news perceptions may be somewhat biased downward.] Further, the quiz was promoted via social media, making the survey experience similar to casual news consumption. My study is the first to use such a realistic instrument to measure evaluations of news stories and news media.

Stories evaluated in the study were news headlines selected from Russian and foreign media and slightly edited for clarity.^[Some of these statements were false. To determine veracity, I relied on fact-checking websites and did additional fact-checking using reputable news agencies.] The quiz was available online for about three weeks, and at each moment, respondents evaluated fourteen messages selected before the beginning of the study and two "current" messages, which were regularly scraped from the news aggregator Yandex.News. In total, twenty "current" messages were included, two at a time. These stories allowed me to increase the ecological validity of the analysis [@PennycookEtAl2021]. Respondents could also take the quiz again and evaluate additional sixteen "pre-selected" stories. The full list of stories and the detailed selection procedure are in [Appendix B](#appendixB). Some of these stories were also included in Studies 2 and 3 to understand whether the findings generalize to other samples.

The main study was implemented as a stand-alone web application, and respondents were recruited via social media ads on Facebook.^[Russian internet users are a highly relevant group for this analysis, as they are more interested in news, and autocrats increasingly target internet audiences [@King.etal2017; @Sanovich.etal2018].] In 2020, around 80% of Russians were internet users^[According to the media analytics company Mediascope: https://mediascope.net/news/1250827/.], and many were Facebook users.^[In 2020, about 40 million people in Russia accessed Facebook at least once a month: https://ppc.world/articles/auditoriya-shesti-krupneyshih-socsetey-v-rossii-v-2020-godu-izuchaem-insayty/.] I followed the suggestions from @Zhang.etal2020 in using Facebook's ad targeting features to make sure that key demographic subgroups were well represented in the sample.

The quiz was completed by 23,179 respondents. 13 percent were not asked about presidential approval. In the remaining sample, 8 percent did not report their approval of Putin, and about 13 percent did not answer questions about their age, gender, or education. Respondents with missing approval were removed from the sample,^[In an additional analysis, available upon request, I used a model-based approach to impute the missing approval values, and the results were almost identical.] as well as respondents who indicated having taken this quiz earlier (3 percent). I also removed the responses from those participants who labeled all stories uniformly (all true or all false), as well as unrealistically fast responses (that took less than one second). Such irregular responses amounted to less than 2 percent of the data. The resulting data set includes 306,801 decisions on the truthfulness of news messages made by 17,974 respondents. Analyses in the appendix Figure B4 and Table B7 use a larger sample as they do not rely on presidential approval. Summary statistics for all three studies are in Table \@ref(tab:sumstats3) in the appendix.

**Establishing the preference for pro-regime content** (H1). This analysis is based on evaluations of 50 stories listed in Table \@ref(tab:stories2020), including 15 pro-Russia messages and 11 critical messages. I labeled stories "pro-Russia" if they were positive statements about Russia and its government or statements about problems in the West or Ukraine; these messages were mostly taken from state-run media. E.g., one such (false) story suggests that "_Pope Francis awards [Russian President Vladimir] Putin with a medal called 'Angel, Guardian of Peace.' The medal is awarded once in a hundred years, and Putin is its fifth recipient._" Stories were labeled "critical" if they were about problems in Russia or failures of the Russian government or if they contained positive statements about Western countries and Ukraine; these stories were mostly taken from independent media. For example: "_Putin signs a new law that gives him lifetime immunity and the right to be a lifetime senator._" 

In the analysis below, I examine Russians' preference for pro-regime or critical messages by comparing the share of Putin supporters who said that these messages were true with the share of Putin critics who said the same. These comparisons are estimated as covariate-adjusted contrasts based on the following linear regression:

\noindent $R_{is} = \alpha + \beta DIRECTION_{s}*SUPPORT_{i} + \gamma DIRECTION_{s} + \delta SUPPORT_{i} + \psi X_{is} + \epsilon_{is}$,

\noindent where $R$ is whether the respondent said the story is true, $DIRECTION$ is a set of dummies indicating whether stories are pro-Russia, critical, or neutral, $SUPPORT$ indicates support for Putin (see below), and $X$ are controls, including respondent age, sex, and education, story-level covariates, and the date of the survey. $i$ indexes respondents, and $s$ indexes news stories. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered on the respondent level.
 
**Establishing the perceived credibility of state propaganda outlets** (H2a and H3). To examine whether supporters view state-run outlets as more trustworthy, I followed an approach common in the research on source credibility [@Botero.etal2015; @Truex2016a]. News stories shown to participants were randomly attributed to one news outlet from a list of state and independent news organizations. The name and logo of this randomly chosen outlet were displayed above the text, as shown in Figure \@ref(fig:vignette) in the appendix. The nature of the treatments was revealed in the post-survey debriefing.

Each story received either a **state media treatment** (a government-controlled outlet) or an **independent media treatment**. At the time of the survey, consumers could easily access all assigned news outlets. State media treatments included the two main television stations, _Channel One_ and _Russia-24_, _RIA Novosti_ (the main official news agency), _Komsomolskaya Pravda_ (_KP_; the most popular newspaper and website in Russia), and _RT_ (_Russia Today_), a television channel targeted at foreign audiences but also popular in Russia. All except _KP_ were owned by the state; _KP_ was controlled by Sergei Rudnov, a son of Vladimir Putin's friend Oleg Rudnov. Critical media treatments included _Rain_, an online television station, _Meduza_, a popular website, and _Echo of Moscow_, a liberal radio station and a website.^[One other treatment was _RBC_, a private news agency recently acquired by a Kremlin-friendly oligarch. _RBC_ was excluded from the main analysis, but as a robustness check, Figure \@ref(fig:onlinestateeffectalt) in Appendix B presents the main experimental result assuming _RBC_ to be state-controlled, and the estimates are similar.] Randomization worked as intended (see Table \@ref(tab:balanceonline) in Appendix B).

This analysis examines the evaluations of the same stories as above, excluding three "pre-selected" stories from the beginning of the quiz, which were not a part of the experiment, and sixteen stories from the second quiz (see above), which respondents saw after the debriefing. The resulting set of messages includes 9 pro-Russia, 5 critical, and 17 neutral stories (stories 4--14 and 31--50 in Table \@ref(tab:stories2020)).

The texts of the news stories were identical in all treatment groups. The quantity of interest is the difference between the share of respondents who deemed news stories to be true under the **state media treatment** and the share of respondents who said so under the **independent media treatment**. To establish this effect for Putin supporters and Putin critics, I estimate the following regression:

\noindent $R_{is} = \alpha + \beta SOURCE_{is}*SUPPORT_{i} + \gamma SOURCE_{is} + \delta SUPPORT_{i} + \psi X_{is} + \epsilon_{is}$,

\noindent where $R$ is the respondent's evaluation of the story (true or false), $SOURCE$ is a set of dummies indicating whether the source is state-controlled or indicating individual news sources (in some models), $SUPPORT$ indicates support for Putin, and $X$ are respondent-level and story-level controls. To test H3, which posits more trust in state media among critics and less trust among supporters when these media "send" critical messages, I include a triple interaction between story source, support for Putin, and story direction. 

## The National Survey (Study 2)

I embedded a similarly designed experiment in a nationally representative survey of 1608 Russian adults by the polling firm Levada Center. As in the main study, respondents saw several news messages, including pro-Russia and critical stories, which were attributed to a state-run or a critical media outlet. The respondents were to decide whether these stories were true. For practical reasons, there were three story vignettes and two news sources, _Channel One_ and _Echo of Moscow_. Further details of the survey and the embedded experiment are provided in [Appendix C](#appendixC). I estimate the effect of the state media treatment using the same strategy as with the main experiment.

## The Media Perceptions Survey (Study 3)

The third study establishes whether Putin supporters are more likely than critics to perceive state-run media outlets as accurate and trustworthy (H2b). The survey was conducted via the polling company OMI, drawing a sample of 2,200 from OMI's large online panel of respondents in all eight federal districts of Russia. I implemented age and sex quotas derived from a nationally representative sample of the Russian population.

The first measure of interest is whether one trusts any state media or any independent media. I asked respondents to name two or three news outlets that they trust the most. Then, two dummy variables capturing whether one named any state-run television stations or any independent news outlets,^[The full list of state-controlled and independent media outlets is provided in [Appendix B](#appendixB).] respectively, were constructed. I estimated the differences in trust between supporters and critics via the following regression:

\noindent $T_{i} = \alpha + \beta SUPPORT_{i} + \gamma X_{i} + \epsilon_{i}$,

\noindent where $T$ is trust in state-run or independent media, $SUPPORT$ indicates support for Putin, and $X$ are sociodemographic controls. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors were used.

The second set of measures captures the perceived accuracy and bias of four state media outlets: _Channel One_, _Russia-24_, _RIA_, and _RT_. I use two dimensions to capture the perceptions of accuracy [@Meyer1988; @Kohring.Matthes2007]: (1) whether these media offer complete, uncensored news coverage, and (2) whether they report the facts accurately; see [Appendix D](#appendixD) for question wording. Two dimensions were used to characterize media bias: (1) whether the coverage of the outlet is pro-government, anti-government, or neutral, and (2) whether the outlet is editorially independent of the authorities.

Given multiple answer options, including "hard to say," I analyze these perceptions via multinomial logistic regressions, and I control for whether one indicated knowing the state-controlled outlet in question. Otherwise, the regression setup is the same.

## Measuring Support for Putin

All three studies included the following question: "_Do you approve of the performance of the president of Russia?_" Response options were: certainly approve, somewhat approve, somewhat disapprove, certainly disapprove (in some analyses below, I use a dichotomized measure of support). This language has been commonly used in Russian polls to establish support for President Putin. A recent study has found that surveys asking such questions produced adequate estimates of presidential approval [@Frye.etal2017], at least before Putin's regime became more repressive in 2022. The risk of overstating support in an anonymous online survey was even lower [@Huang2017].^[In the pre-testing, there was virtually no difference in the probability of continuing the survey depending on whether the question about presidential approval was included.] To mitigate reverse causation, the question about Putin's support was asked before information treatments. 

Figure \@ref(fig:supportdist) shows the distribution of presidential approval in all three surveys, indicating that in the two online surveys, the share of supporters is substantially lower. For this study, it is most important to have sufficient variation in presidential approval within each sample, but the diversity of these samples also helps establish that the relationships of interest hold in different groups of the Russian population.

```{r supportdist, echo = FALSE, fig.show = "hold", fig.width=10, fig.height=9, out.width = "65%", fig.align = "center", fig.showtext = TRUE, fig.cap = "The distribution of presidential approval in the three survey samples: the social media sample, the online sample (OMI), the nationally representative sample (Levada)"}

pa <- read_csv("Estimates/Figure_1_approval_dist_3_surveys.csv") %>%
  mutate(approval = factor(approval, 
                           levels = c("Certainly\napprove",
                                      "Somewhat\napprove",
                                      "Somewhat\ndisapprove",
                                      "Certainly\ndisapprove")),
         sample = factor(
           sample, 
           levels = c("Main\nstudy",
                      "Online\npanel", 
                      "National")))

ggplot(pa, 
       aes(sample, share, color = sample, fill = sample)) +
  geom_bar(stat = "identity", width = 0.9, 
           position = position_dodge(width = 0.1)) +
  geom_text(aes(label = share), 
            position = position_stack(vjust = 0.5),
            color = "white", size = 9) +
  scale_color_manual(values = c("#1b9e77", "#d95f02", "#7570b3")) +
  scale_fill_manual(values = c("#1b9e77", "#d95f02", "#7570b3")) +
  labs(x = "", y = "", 
       title = "Distribution of Putin's approval in the surveys, %") +
  myggtheme +
  theme(legend.position = "none") +
  facet_wrap(~approval, ncol = 2) 


```

Support for Putin is used as a key measure of pro-regime orientations. In the appendix, I report the results with additional measures of these orientations, which reflect the anti-Western and pro-state views of Putin supporters; these results are similar.

# Findings {#Findings}

## Supporters Are Receptive to Identity-Consistent Stories

Figure \@ref(fig:storyperceptions) shows that Putin supporters on average were 11.5 percentage points more likely to find pro-Russia stories credible than were Putin critics (estimates in black show the average difference across all pro-Russia stories, adjusting for covariates, including age, gender, and education). These disagreements are about the same when the analysis is restricted to respondents who evaluated news stories without any sources (Figure \@ref(fig:storyperc2)). The pattern is consistent across different samples of Russians (Figure \@ref(fig:storiesthreesurveys)). For "baseline" levels of belief in each story among supporters and critics, see Table \@ref(tab:stories2020).

The estimates in gray show disagreements about message subcategories---stories positive or critical about Putin, Russia, the West, or Ukraine. Supporters were most receptive to anti-Western messages. As an example, 73 percent of pro-Putin respondents found credible a false story that California had banned the words "husband" and "wife" to support same-sex marriages. This story appeals to the anti-LGBTQ sentiment that many Putin supporters share and their perceptions of the United States as a threat to "traditional" values.

At the same time, only 23 percent of supporters believed a false statement saying that Pope Francis had awarded Putin with a rare medal for his efforts to improve world peace. Unlike the story about California, this pro-Russia message did not speak to views deeply held by pro-regime citizens, so most of them deemed the story implausible. In other words, Putin supporters do not automatically accept propaganda falsehoods: they only do so as long as messages reflect their core beliefs.

```{r storyperceptions, echo = FALSE, fig.show = "hold", fig.width=14, fig.height=8, out.width = "85%", fig.align = "center", fig.showtext = TRUE, fig.cap = "Difference between Putin supporters and critics in the probability of finding pro-Russia and critical stories credible. Results from the main study. 95\\% confidence intervals are shown."}

stories_perc <- read_csv("Estimates/Figure_2_B2_stories_perc_by_approval_adj.csv") %>%
filter(contrast == "All supporters vs critics") %>%
                mutate(Stories = factor(Stories, 
                            levels = c(
                              "Praising Ukraine", "Criticizing Russia",
                              "Criticizing Putin", "Critical stories, mean", 
                              "Criticizing West", "Criticizing Ukraine",  
                              "Praising Russia", "Praising Putin", 
                              "Pro-Russia stories, mean")))

ggplot(stories_perc, 
       aes(Stories, diff, linetype = `Story content`, shape = `Story content`, color = model,
       alpha = model)) +
  geom_point(size = 4,
             position = position_dodge(width = 0.4)) +
  geom_errorbar(aes(ymin = conf.low,
                    ymax = conf.high),
                width = 0,
                position = position_dodge(width = 0.4),
                size = 1.1) +
  geom_text(aes(label = round(diff, 1)), vjust = -0.5, size = 6, 
            family = "sourcesanspro", show.legend = F) +
  scale_color_manual(values = c("black", "darkgray"), guide = "none")  +
  scale_alpha_manual(values = c(0.6, 1), 
                     guide = "none") +
  geom_hline(yintercept = 0, linetype = "dashed", col = "gray") +
  labs(x = "", 
       y = "Difference in the probability of saying\nstory is true, percentage points, 95% CI",
       title = "Belief in pro-Russia and critical stories",
       subtitle = "Difference between Putin supporters and opposition-minded respondents") +
  ylim(c(-20, 20)) +
  myggtheme +
  coord_flip()


```

Figure \@ref(fig:storyperceptions) also shows a strong bias against critical messages among Putin supporters: on average, they were 17 percentage points less likely to recognize such stories as true. Only 16 percent of supporters, for example, found credible a report that Putin had given himself lifelong immunity from prosecution, and only 15 percent believed a report that the Ukrainian economy had been growing faster than the Russian economy (both reports were true).

## Supporters Find Propaganda Outlets More Credible Than Independent Media

According to my theory, the focus on belief-consistent information makes state propaganda outlets appear more credible to supporters compared to independent, critical media.

Figure \@ref(fig:onlinestateeffect) shows the effect of changing the treatment from an independent media source to a state-run source on the probability of saying that news stories are true, depending on presidential approval. The figure shows the average effect^[The effect is the difference between the share of respondents that found a story true and the share of respondents that found a story false, averaged over stories and adjusted for covariates. The effect is calculated for each subgroup via the R package _emmeans_ [@Lenth2019] based on the regression model.] across all messages ("All stories"; the estimates in black) as well as the effects for different subcategories of news stories, which are discussed in detail below. "Strong" supporters or critics are those who "certainly" approve or disapprove of the president, and "moderate" supporters or critics are those who "somewhat" approve or disapprove. 

```{r onlinestateeffect, echo = FALSE, fig.show = "hold", fig.width=14, fig.height=8, out.width = "85%", fig.align = "center", fig.showtext = TRUE, fig.cap = "The effect of changing the treatment (source attribution) from an independent to state media outlet on evaluations of news stories, by approval of Vladimir Putin. Calculations based on linear regressions of news story evaluations on state control and presidential approval; results from the main study. 95\\% confidence intervals are shown", fig.scap = "Treatment effects"}

main_treatment_effect <- read_csv("Estimates/Figure_3_main_treatment_effect_estimates.csv") %>%
  mutate(pres_approval_cat = factor(pres_approval_cat, 
                    levels = c("Strong\ncritic",
                               "Moderate\ncritic",
                               "Moderate\nsupporter",
                               "Strong\nsupporter")),
                               story_direction = factor(story_direction, levels = c("Critical",
"Pro-Russia", "Neutral", "All stories")),
story_direction = factor(story_direction, levels = c("Critical",
"Pro-Russia", "Neutral", "All stories")))

ggplot(main_treatment_effect, 
       aes(pres_approval_cat, estimate,
           shape = story_direction, linetype = story_direction, 
           color = story_direction)) +
  geom_point(size = 4,
             position = position_dodge(width = 0.6)) +
  geom_errorbar(aes(ymin = conf.low,
                    ymax = conf.high),
                width = 0,
                position = position_dodge(width = 0.6),
                size = 1.1) +
  scale_color_manual(values = c("gray25", "gray50", "gray75", "black")) +
  scale_linetype_manual(values = c("dashed", "dotted", "dotted", "solid")) +
  scale_shape_manual(values = c(18, 15, 17, 19)) +
  geom_hline(yintercept = 0, linetype = "dashed", col = "gray") +
  labs(x = "", y = "Effect of switching the source from independent to state media",
       title = "Supporters find state media more credible",
       subtitle = "(except when critical stories are considered)",
       linetype = "Story group", shape = "Story group", color = "Story group") +
  ylim(c(-15, 15)) +
  myggtheme +
  coord_flip()

```

In line with my expectations, Putin supporters were 2-3 percentage points more likely to say that a story was true when it was attributed to a state propaganda outlet, compared to when an independent news outlet was assigned. In other words, pro-regime respondents find state media more credible even though these outlets often engage in censorship and disinformation. This finding highlights how trust in news sources can be driven by political affinity rather than by the accuracy of reporting.

These results are robust to different model specifications and to using alternative measures of pro-regime orientations (Tables \@ref(tabonlinestatemediaeffect) and \@ref(tabonlinestatemediaeffectaltapproval), Figures \@ref(fig:onlinestateeffectpride) and \@ref(fig:onlinestateeffectalt) in the appendix). The results are, moreover, consistent across individual state-run and independent sources (Figure \@ref(fig:onlinepredictedbysource)) and "pre-selected" and "current" news stories (Table \@ref(tabonlinestatemediaeffecttopic) and Figure \@ref(fig:onlinestateregimecurrent)). Further, in the experiment that I embedded in a national survey by the Levada Center (Study 2), Putin supporters also perceived information attributed to state media as more credible (Figure \@ref(fig:levadaeffectvote)).

## Critical Messages From State Media Backfire Among Supporters

My theory suggests that if state media outlets moderate their pro-regime bias by sending more critical messages, this can improve trust among opposition-minded citizens but undermine trust among supporters. The effects split by story category in Figure \@ref(fig:onlinestateeffect) support this argument. 

For pro-Russia and neutral messages, the effect of state media was in line with the average results reported earlier---it was positive for Putin supporters and negative for Putin critics. However, when critical stories were considered, the effect was less negative among Putin critics---they were *less* skeptical about propaganda outlets when these outlets "sent" more critical messages---but it was essentially zero among strong Putin supporters. While the evidence here is not definitive (the confidence intervals overlap), it highlights an important trade-off: When state outlets provide more accurate information, they may gain some trust among critics, but they could lose their credibility advantage among core supporters. This result also supports the notion that trust in state media among supporters is driven by the emphasis of these media on pro-Russia messages. 

## Additional Evidence: Supporters Find Propaganda Outlets Trustworthy Despite the Bias

In the online survey fielded via OMI (the media perceptions survey), I asked Russians to report their perceptions of state-run and independent media outlets. Figure \@ref(fig:omitrust) demonstrates that the overwhelming majority of regime supporters trusted at least one state television station, whereas most critics did not trust any state television channels. The pattern for independent media was reversed (for regression estimates, see Table \@ref(tabomimediatrust) in Appendix D. Figure \@ref(fig:mediausage) in the appendix shows that pro-Putin respondents predominantly learned news from state propaganda outlets, and they were highly unlikely to use any independent media).

It is worth noting that among Putin critics, trust in independent media was still quite low. Moderate critics, in particular, trusted state television more often than independent outlets. One reason for this lack of trust may be that Russian independent journalists lean toward liberal viewpoints, whereas regime critics often hold illiberal---e.g., nationalist---views (see related evidence from the Levada survey in the appendix Figure \@ref(fig:levadaeffectvote)). Therefore, in autocracies such as Putin's Russia, independent media may struggle to appeal even to opposition-minded citizens.

```{r omitrust, echo = FALSE, fig.show = "hold", fig.width=14, fig.height=8, out.width = "85%", fig.align = "center", fig.showtext=T,  fig.cap = "The probability of trusting independent media or state television, by approval of Vladimir Putin. Calculation based on linear regressions of media use (dummy variables) on presidential approval and demographic covariates; results from the OMI online panel (Study 3). 95\\% confidence intervals are shown"}

omi_trust <- read_csv("Estimates/Figure_4_OMI_media_trust.csv")  %>%
  mutate(x = factor(x, levels = c("Strong\ncritic",
                               "Moderate\ncritic",
                               "Moderate\nsupporter",
                               "Strong\nsupporter")),
         media = factor(media, levels = c("State TV", "Independent")))

ggplot(omi_trust, 
       aes(x, estimate, linetype = media, shape = media)) +
  geom_point(size = 4,
             position = position_dodge(width = 0.4)) +
  geom_text(aes(label = media, vjust = if_else(media == "State TV", -.5, -2.5)), size = 8,
            family = "sourcesanspro", show.legend = F) +
  geom_errorbar(aes(ymin = conf.low,
                    ymax = conf.high),
                width = 0,
                position = position_dodge(width = 0.4), size = 1.1) +
  #scale_color_manual(values = c("#d73027", "#4575b4")) +
  labs(x = "", y = "Probability of trusting state TV or independent media, percent",
       title = "Putin supporters list state TV among trusted sources",
       linetype = "", shape = "") +
  ylim(c(-2, 90)) +
  myggtheme +
  coord_flip()

```

The respondents were also asked to evaluate key state media outlets---_Channel One_, _Russia-24_, _RIA_, and _RT_---along four dimensions: whether their coverage was accurate, complete (uncensored), and politically unbiased, and whether these outlets were politically independent. Figure \@ref(fig:omiperc) reports the percentage of Putin supporters and critics who agreed with such characterizations of state media (regression tables are in [Appendix D](#appendixD)).

```{r omiperc, echo = FALSE, fig.show = "hold", fig.width=14, fig.height=8, out.width = "100%", fig.align = "center", fig.showtext=T, fig.cap = "The probability of agreeing with the statements that state media (Channel One, Russia-24, RIA, RT) are accurate, not censored, politically independent, and politically unbiased, by approval of Vladimir Putin. Calculations based on multinomial regressions of news source evaluations on presidential approval and demographic covariates; results from the OMI online panel (Study 3). 95\\% confidence intervals are shown"}

perc <- read_csv("Estimates/Figure_5_omi_perceptions_probs_all.csv")  %>%
mutate(source = factor(source, 
                  levels = c("RT", "RIA", "Russia-24", 
                             "Channel One")),
         pres_approval_dummy = factor(pres_approval_dummy,
                                           levels = c("Putin supporter",
                                                      "Putin critic")))

ggplot(perc, 
       aes(source, prob, shape = pres_approval_dummy,
           linetype = pres_approval_dummy, color = pres_approval_dummy)) +
  geom_point(size = 3.5) +
  geom_errorbar(aes(ymin = conf.low,
                    ymax = conf.high),
                width = 0, size = 1.2) +
  geom_text(aes(label = prob), vjust = -1, size = 7, family = "sourcesanspro", show.legend = F) +
  scale_color_manual(values = c("black", "darkgray")) +
  labs(x = "", y = "Probability of saying that media outlets are\naccurate, uncensored, independent, or politically unbiased",
       title = "Supporters evaluate state media as accurate despite bias",
       linetype = "", shape = "", color = "") +
  myggtheme +
  coord_flip() +
  theme(legend.position = "bottom") +
  facet_wrap(~dimension, ncol = 4)

```

Importantly, the majority of supporters recognized that state media were influenced by the authorities and were not neutral or objective; only 30--40 percent of pro-Putin respondents believed state propaganda outlets to be politically neutral and independent. But, consistent with expectations, most supporters thought the coverage of propaganda outlets to be generally accurate, and they said that these outlets rarely engaged in censorship. For example, 58 percent of supporters admitted that _Channel One_ was not independent of the authorities. And yet, 49 percent of those who recognized this lack of independence claimed that _Channel One_'s coverage was mostly accurate, and 34 percent of them listed this station among trusted news outlets. This underscores how little citizens may value media independence and balanced reporting when media are biased in their preferred direction.

Crucially, positive perceptions of propaganda outlets among pro-regime citizens did not result from poor awareness of alternative news sources. In the OMI survey, almost 60 percent of Putin supporters reported knowledge of some independent news organizations, which at the time of the survey were easily available online. However, as Figures \@ref(fig:omitrustknowledge) and \@ref(fig:omiperceptionsknowledge) in the appendix show, pro-regime respondents who were aware of independent media still trusted state media a great deal, and they evaluated state-controlled outlets quite positively. Therefore, for many pro-Putin respondents, being in the propaganda bubble was a choice, not an inevitability.

Regime supporters did not view independent media as a better alternative even if they found state media inaccurate or biased. Among pro-Putin respondents who found _Channel One_ accurate and truthful, 6.2 percent reported trusting at least one independent news outlet, and among supporters who admitted that _Channel One_ often publishes false information, this proportion was 10.3 percent---not much higher.

Finally, Putin supporters evaluated state media much more positively than did critics. Among opposition-minded respondents, only a small minority said that state propaganda outlets were accurate and uncensored, and very few called these outlets unbiased and independent. This large divergence between critics and supporters emphasizes that state media would not gain much by moderating their coverage. It would probably be not enough to win back the skeptics who are very strongly predisposed against state outlets, whereas pro-regime citizens, as demonstrated in the experiment, may be alienated by critical messages.

# Conclusion {#Conclusion -}

This study has used a unique experimental approach and survey data from Russia to highlight an important and often overlooked role of propaganda---building and maintaining a relationship with the public through belief-affirming messages. Leaders such as Vladimir Putin can identify narratives and emotions that resonate with citizens and maintain credibility by crafting propaganda around these narratives. Hence, we often observe a genuine preference for state media and propagandistic content among pro-regime citizens.

I also find that regime supporters view independent news organizations as less reliable than state media. Thus, my analysis provides further support for the argument that the availability of alternative, politically neutral outlets may not reduce media bias or trust in unreliable sources [@GentzkowEtAl2021]. In other words, extending access to independent news media would not deter citizens from consuming propaganda.^[Similarly, @ChenYang2019 show that many citizens in China would not engage with independent foreign media even when given easy access to such media.] Supporting independent journalism is still important, but its role as an antidote to propaganda is limited, as it mostly appeals to citizens who are already critical of their governments.

Research on autocracies often argues that informed, skeptical, sophisticated citizens pose a serious problem for these regimes [@GurievTreisman2019; @Walker.Orttung2014]. My analysis, however, suggests that when a large majority is attuned to the regime's affirmation propaganda, autocrats may ignore these sophisticated skeptics and focus on the sympathetic masses instead. Moreover, producing more accurate and balanced reporting, designed to appeal to skeptics, can invoke a backlash among core supporters. 

At the same time, affirmation propaganda does not necessarily replace persuasion and other propaganda strategies. In some situations---e.g., when the primary goal is to preserve and reinforce pro-regime views or trust in propagandistic media---affirmation propaganda can take the central role, and in other cases, it can complement persuasion and improve its effectiveness. For example, state media can win public trust by appealing to citizens' core beliefs, and they can exploit this trust to manipulate beliefs on other, more peripheral issues.

I also highlight that the influence of propaganda is fundamentally limited. When it does not engage with citizens' identities, core beliefs, and values, it is difficult to make even the pro-regime public accept such messages. This is why the Russian government often struggles with promoting genuinely unpopular measures, such as anti-COVID restrictions [@Kovalev2021], or manipulating the perceptions of economic problems [@Rosenfeld2018].

The lessons from this analysis are most relevant to electoral autocracies and "illiberal democracies" that rely on public support and information manipulation, avoiding large-scale repression. Future studies may examine the roles that propaganda plays in other such regimes---for example, to what extent and how leaders such as Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey or Viktor Orbán in Hungary use belief-affirming tactics---as well as the extent to which affirmation propaganda is employed in more closed regimes such as China. 

An important implication of my analysis is that autocrats should place less emphasis on belief affirmation and more emphasis on alternative tactics (e.g., persuading through more balanced messaging) when their support is low or unstable---for example, during crises when governments have to respond to major problems. It is worth investigating how autocrats choose and adjust their propaganda strategies in such situations, as well as how the role of propaganda may change when an informational autocrat turns to harsher and more repressive tactics, as Vladimir Putin did during Russia's war against Ukraine. While this study helps understand why Russians were initially receptive to the Kremlin's pro-war propaganda, it remains to be seen for how long such trust may hold in wartime conditions, especially when the regime expects sacrifices from the public.

# References {-}

<div id="refs"></div>

```{r appendix, child = 'Shirikov_trust_propaganda_appendix_2023_JOP.Rmd'}
```